

## Memory and Dignity: Can We Stay Human?

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### **Abstract**

*Paul Ricoeur's studies have left us with a significant legacy of reflections on memory, identity and history. Today, this legacy can help us uphold a fundamental moral value: dignity. Building on reflections on the dual nature of dignity as "active" and "passive", this contribution considers the narrative construction of individual and collective memory, particularly with regard to the attribution of memories and dignity to the moral subject. The vanished squares of medieval Rome, Ajax in Sophocles' tragedy, the protagonist of George Orwell's novel Nineteen Eighty-Four who cannot forget a particular gesture: these are the figures we turn to in order to explain how we can save human dignity. Finally, we aim to establish whether the concepts of dignity and memory, as interpreted by Ricoeur, can still serve as ethical guides when faced with the challenges posed by biomedical technologies and robotics.*

**Keywords:** Paul Ricoeur, Dignity, Memory, Awareness, Cyber-Bioethics

### **1. Introduction**

This contribution will try to be not an essay but an open exploration.

Memory is not a closed or completed task. Memory is open in the sense that it always calls us to action, it is always a "temptation" to action, as Tzvetan Todorov would say with the title of his remarkable

book from twenty-six years ago, *Memoire du Mal, Tentation du Bien* (Todorov 2000).

In this sense we would like to see memory and dignity brought together.

My first suggestion is the new beautiful *Piazza Pia* in Rome, which was inaugurated in December 2024 for the Jubilee, with its geometric fountains opening onto Via della Conciliazione. This square makes it possible to walk from Castel Sant'Angelo to St. Peter's. Until 2023, and for decades, this area was dominated by the traffic of cars, buses and scooters.

But few people know that until 1936, in place of Via della Conciliazione, there was an entire neighborhood called *Spina di Borgo*, with squares, fountains and ancient buildings of great artistic and aesthetic value, which were demolished precisely for the construction of this majestic access road to St. Peter's. Old photos of that place really make an impression on us (Parisi Presicce, Petacco 2016). They belong to Rome's memories.

For some, it is a painful memory. There is always a sense of loss when something is taken away. For others, however, it is a memory fulfilled by the city's transformation and evolution. You decide.

When the new Piazza Pia was inaugurated and closed to traffic, almost as it was in the old days, many people said: "Dignity has been restored to this area".

What does that mean? To which idea of dignity are we referring?

Why do we describe a place, a behaviour, a gesture or a person as "dignified"? What do we expect from this quality of dignity? The dignity of a city over time is guaranteed by the shared memory of places like that. Memory is therefore dignified, and, at the same time, memory constitutes dignity.

This is the fundamental thesis of our reflections, which will lead us from philosophy to biomedical technologies. Let's try to understand this properly.

## **2. Active and Passive Dignity**

There are two types of dignity that we can talk about. One, that we call *active*.

When we think of ancient Greece, we think of the dignity in man's public actions that made the heroes of Homer and classical tragedy worthy of honour. In other words, we are talking about the power of action recognised by the Greeks in the man ἄξιος: someone who acts for the good of their family and political community; someone who receives glory as a reward for their actions. Consider Hector's character in Homer's *Iliad*, as well as *Ajax* as described by Sophocles in his eponymous tragedy, despite Ajax's madness at the behest of the goddess who punished him.

Ajax was the prudent and reliable warrior who did not seek to be a hero, but rather sought to perform his task to the best of his ability. He knew that his role was crucial to his side's war operations. He was convinced that he deserved the weapons of Achilles, who had died in battle. Achilles had promised him the weapons in return for his sacrifice, seriousness and consistency. However, he saw them taken away by the more cunning Ulysses. Blinded by the enemy goddess Athena, he went mad and, believing he was attacking his comrades, slaughtered oxen and rams, covering himself in ridicule. It was a pitiful scene.

When he came to his senses, he was filled with shame and decided to redeem his honour and dignity by committing suicide, which would bring him eternal glory.

Luca Micheletti's direction for the 2024 season of the *National Institute of Ancient Drama in Syracuse (INDA)* powerfully expressed this public dimension of dignity, in contrast to the Achaeans, in the shame

of helpless animals slaughtered. On stage, the real protagonists were the blood of the massacre and the body of the hero, which symbolized that offended dignity, along with all the dilemmas and dramas surrounding the uncertain burial.

The death of Ajax marks a turning point between two eras and two civilisations. The first, based on the law of the strongest, inescapable revenge and the absence of moral grey areas, with heroes who “live nobly or die nobly”, gives way to a second civilisation in which a new sense of humanity prevails and absolute reason and the irrevocability of decisions no longer exist. The distinction between right and wrong becomes blurred, and the actions of 'new' heroes and leaders, such as Odysseus, appear to consider not only strength, but also common sense, reasonableness and sometimes cunning. This is the area of consciousness that will be part of an undoubtedly post-Homeric, existential vision and encompasses the incongruous, the relative and the opportune – what Albini called “the instability of the human”. (Micheletti 2024: 15; the translation is mine)

It was Aristotle who expanded this elitist concept of dignity to include all men, albeit to varying degrees. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* dignity is linked to “magnanimity”: the magnanimous, the great-souled man, is one who considers himself worthy of great things, being indeed worthy of them, while one who does so without being worthy is a fool, and none of those who live according to virtue are fools or senseless (Aristotle, Book IV, 7-9, 1123-1125a).

In his description of the moral “golden mean”, Aristotle places magnanimity between two non-virtuous extremes. On the one hand, there are those who are worthy of small things and consider

themselves worthy only of those. On the other hand, there are those who consider themselves worthy of smaller things than they deserve. In all these cases, the man is neither magnanimous nor dignified: in the first case, he is 'modest'; in the second, he is 'timid'; and in the third, he is 'vain' and has the vice of presumption.

Therefore, magnanimity is a virtue that stems from feeling worthy of great things in a proportionate and consistent manner, in line with one's merits, without excessive self-presumption or arrogance.

The measure of dignity lies in this awareness, determined by the actions one is called upon to perform out of duty. However, in the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle establishes a hierarchy in which those who are aware of their own merits are at the top.

But this position may not be fixed once and for all: even those who desire small things, but are aware that their merits are adequate, are not less worthy than the magnanimous. The difference in dignity lies in the actions performed, not the person's qualities.

This discernment of one's own abilities is the fulcrum of a flexible hierarchy, in which even those at the bottom because of their actions can become magnanimous thanks to reason, which allows them to learn the degrees of virtue.

This "active" dimension of dignity requires social recognition, as does honour in the Roman concept of *dignitas*. In ancient Rome, *dignitas* was associated with social standing and the respect afforded to individuals based on their status and conduct. Thus, a Roman citizen who displayed values such as *gravitas*, *constantia*, *fides* and *pietas* would become a Roman in possession of *dignitas*, and would earn *auctoritas*, that is to say, prestige and respect.

In *De Inventione*, Cicero attempts to define *dignitas* as "the recognised authority of a person, a quality in turn deserving of deference,

honour, and respect” (Cicero, 2,166)<sup>1</sup>. In *De Republica*, however, the term *gradus dignitatis* appears for the first time in the famous *Book I*, which provides a political description of the progressive degrees of dignity. According to Cicero, all forms of government, whether monarchy, oligarchy or democracy, have an intrinsic potential to deteriorate into tyranny, oligarchy or ochlocracy. As Cicero writes, “when everything is in the hands of the people, even if they are moderate and just, absolute equality is in itself unfair because it makes no distinction of merit” (Cicero, I, 27-43)<sup>2</sup>.

A failure to acknowledge merit results in a flattening of hierarchies and a dilution of political and moral standards. This happens in a deteriorating democracy, or when power is concentrated in the hands of a few, or even one person. This renders *dignitas* meaningless when it actually requires institutional recognition.

The steps of *dignitas* can be climbed, but they can also be disastrously descended due to deplorable personal conduct or the general compromise of the institutional context, which leads to a devaluation of dignity. It is the risk of losing a social scale of excellence measured by virtue and merit, easily replaced by money. If “merit belongs to no one, money makes everyone equal” (Vincenti 2009: 14; the translation is mine), as some commenters have rightly concluded.

However, here we are at the point. The other side of the first type of dignity, that we have defined as “active”, is the second type namely “passive” dignity (Abbate 2024: 23–36).

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<sup>1</sup> *Dignitas est alicuius honesta et cultu et honore et verecundia digna auctoritas.*

<sup>2</sup> *Sed et in regnis nimis expertes sunt ceteri communis iuris et consilii, et in optimatum dominatu vix particeps libertatis potest esse | multitudo, cum omni consilio communi ac potestate careat, et cum omnia per populum geruntur quamvis iustum atque moderatum, tamen ipsa aequabilitas est iniqua, cum habet nullos gradus dignitatis.*

It is the dignity of someone or something that endures an action, an insult or a wound, yet remains steadfast in its memory of self and its unchanging sense of identity. This passive approach restores dignity, even in moments when it seems to have been lost or negated. It refuses to forget who one is, what one has been through, and what one can become.

Ultimately, Ajax's behaviour in the play demonstrates precisely this intertwining of activity and passivity. Another great character from a different Sophocles tragedy, *Philoctetes*, also embodies this idea. He suffers the inhuman and merciless abandonment of his comrades-in-arms, yet it is through this suffering that he finds his dignity (Nussbaum 1976: 25–53).

So, what is the basis on which the active and passive aspects of dignity are intertwined?

The answer is memory, both personal and collective.

Paul Ricoeur's reflections on history, memory and identity provide us with valuable insights.

Memory is not merely an act of preserving the past or an archive of events; it is also a fundamental dimension in the hermeneutic construction of the present.

The dignity of individuals depends on their recognition of the past, and how they deal with it justly and responsibly. The same applies to societies and communities, which are shaped by a shared memory that gives meaning to the past and provides guidance for the future. In this sense, remembrance also becomes a collective commitment that implies critical reflection on historical injustices and respect for human dignity (Ricoeur 2006).

### **3. Memory between Oneself and Others: Ricoeur's Lesson**

Paul Ricoeur saw memory as something he felt he owed to explore, a theme that "tormented" him as an important absence in both *Time and Narrative* and *Oneself as Another*. It was, in fact, a debt that he repaid during his final years of study.

Memory is constituted at the level of life as a model of the "always-being-mine" of the experiences lived by the subject (Ricoeur 2006), and therefore it is what allows continuity, the link between consciousness and the past. Memories in the plural find coherence and narrative composition precisely in singular memory, and it is memory that guides us through the passage of time, from the past to the future, marking a unified direction. Both individual and collective memory are responsive to this function of connection and orientation.

In this dynamic of memory, the tension between activity and passivity that we described earlier, in relation to dignity, seems to emerge.

We would like to emphasize that the "space of experience", the "horizon of expectation" and memory, are cornerstones of the Self, which constantly offers itself to dignity and life. The narrator recalls what happened previously, but by telling the story backwards, he gives his character the chance to begin his journey into the future and experience everything life has to offer.

The work of life is an invitation to always prioritize the problem of life "until death", as if death was an act "within life".

Exchanging Heidegger's conviction of being-for-death for the attestation of being-until-death requires courage. The "effort" to exist is indeed an effort, but for the benefit of life, its multiple beginnings and new beginnings that give meaning to all the losses, sacrifices and deprivations encountered along life's journey (Ricoeur 1998).

*Who remembers?* This is a question that we have learned to add to Ricoeur's usual ones: Who speaks? Who acts? Who tells the story?

The main connecting point between time and narrative was missing: memory.

To state the identity of an individual of a community is to answer the question 'Who did this?' 'Who is the agent, the author?' We first answer this question by naming someone, that is, by designating them with a proper name. But what is the basis for the permanence of this proper name? What justifies our taking the subject of an action, so designated by his, her or its proper name, as the same throughout a life that stretches from birth to death? The answer has to be narrative. To answer the question 'Who?' as Hannah Arendt has so forcefully put it, is to tell the story of a life. The story told tells about the action of the 'who.' And the identity of this 'who' therefore itself must be narrative identity. (Ricoeur 1988: 246)

Let us introduce ourselves, as far as we can here, to the difficult connection between individual memory and collective memory.

At first glance, memory appears to have only a private and intimate nature. John Locke established it as a criterion for personal identity, a concept that Ricoeur discusses at length in *Oneself as Another* (Ricoeur 1992: 113–139). Memory enables our consciousness to connect with the past – the “present of the past”, as Augustine taught us. The question of how the atoms of so many different memories can be woven into a single thread of continuous memory is answered by the order of narration: stories bring together “plural memories and singular memory”. Ultimately, memory guides us through the passage of time, from the past to the future, providing a sense of continuity.

Now, these explanations of individual memory must serve Ricoeur's most pressing concern, which is collective memory, with its lacks and excesses.

Shortcomings, such as lost pieces of history, forgotten or denied traumas. Excesses, such as crimes committed, humiliations inflicted. And there are cases of censored or manipulated memory.

Neglecting collective memory means ignoring the fact that nations recognize their own identity thanks to shared memories (Ricoeur 2006: 56ff).

But how can we move from individual memory to collective memory?

Firstly, it is important to recognise that we do not remember alone, but with the help of others' memories; our own memories derive from the stories that others have told us. Just think of how we are "enveloped in stories" that make up our identity through the other, and how this process is influenced by our interactions with others. Most of our personal memories are embedded within collective memories.

Once again, the phenomenological approach is decisive. In this case, we find the notion of "personalities of a higher-order", in Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity, as elaborated in the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation*. The predicates we attribute to individual consciousness can be attributed to these collective entities, as explained by Ricoeur (Husserl 1960: 89ff). Thus, the three prerogatives that we recognised in individual memory – always-being-mine, continuity, and the polarity between past and future – become prerogatives attributable to a plural subject. This gives rise to the idea of a "simultaneous, mutual, cross-referenced constitution" of individual and collective memory, an idea that draws heavily on psychoanalytic practice.

The removal of obstacles that prevent patients from reclaiming their own narrative, especially through the evocation of trauma and dark memories, cannot be done alone. A third party is required to accompany the patient in this process: the psychoanalyst.

However, we must also consider the linguistic factor: the fact that memory must be expressed in language manifests the social and public urgency of a consciousness that is not originally private. Our habit of storytelling stems from our previous experience of listening. Someone – Ricoeur writes – told us stories before we were able to tell our own stories. Collective memory paves the way for a discussion of historical time and historical consciousness.

In this discussion, Ricoeur builds on Reinhart Koselleck's insights, particularly those relating to the "space of experience" and the "horizon of expectation" (Koselleck 2004). The space of experience is the repository of sedimented traces and the heritage left by the past, within which our anticipations, projects and fears exist. On the other hand, the horizon of expectation is the line that we aspire to continue in a reasonable way.

Historical consciousness is located at the intersection of these two forces, and the interaction between them is expressed through the living present of a culture. This "living present" is not the instant itself, but rather the richness of the recent past and the near future. Historical consciousness has the potential to provide orientation in the passage of time; this potential is inherent in memory itself. Rather than being sterile nostalgia, memory is the guiding thread of an oriented search through time.

But what if collective memory were to become ill, just as individual memory can, and no longer be healthy? If passive *oblivion* were to overwhelm the layers of memorial experience, what would be the effective remedy? A *wounded* memory requires processing. This is because trauma leaves an imprint. Awareness heals it.

Ricoeur once again confronts psychoanalytic practice, where the main obstacle to traumatic memory is the compulsion to repeat. The patient replicates the forgotten event not in the form of memory, but in the form of actions that they repeat unconsciously.

This is what happens to our societies and peoples when they lose fragments of memory and repeat the same familiar mistakes of history. Freud's proposed the "work of remembering", a concept that holds great significance for Ricoeur.

The patient is encouraged to forge a genuine connection with their past and find the courage to confront the signs of their illness. The analyst is urged to tolerate the patient's repetitions, viewing them as a form of gradual emancipation. If guided effectively, this process paves the way for the second phase of processing.

The "work of remembering" becomes the "work of mourning". When faced with the loss of a loved one, rather than reacting with melancholy, which involves a "diminution of self-esteem" (a spiral of self-deprecation, self-accusation and self-condemnation), one actively performs the work of mourning, which leads to a progressive and free reappropriation of oneself.

So, can't the wounds of shared memory and collective identity be recognised in the losses that people have to deal with? Losses – as Ricoeur points out – affect both power and the territory and populations that constitute the substance of a state, and in the behaviours of mourning and final reconciliation, both individual and public expressions converge. Thomas Hobbes was convinced that it was the fear of violent death that led to the evolution of the contractual pact between men, and remembering wars as the true founding events of the historical community means thinking that "symbolic wounds, which require healing, have been stored in the archives of collective memory".

Here, the work of remembrance becomes necessary, a critical work of submission to reality, of reappropriation of historical identity, without excesses or deficits of memory: it is the work of critical history, which Ricoeur has already approached in other times for the narrative aspect that links it to the structures of storytelling (Ricoeur 1990: 121–174).

At the end of his studies on personal and collective memory, another “fragile sprout” of Ricoeur’s thought emerges: a third type of memory, *mémoire de proches*, or the memory of our closest companions. Ricoeur says that these people, who matter to us and to whom we matter, turn out to be the intermediate level where exchanges between the living memory of individuals and the public memory of communities actually take place.

Those closest to us are the ones who hold fragments of our memory that elude both our personal and collective memory: our birth, our death, the moments that define our identity, and the memories that only those closest to us can truly share, serving as proof of our existence.

Returning to our discussion, this memory in the process of being formed, like a temple with its empty spaces and solid marble, is closely connected to dignity. Dignity is reaffirmed each time through the act of narrating oneself and others, thanks to personal and social endurance.

#### **4. Dignity and New Technologies**

We started by remembering Piazza Pia in Rome, and now we remember a great author, George Orwell. To mark the 75th anniversary of his death in 2025, a British coin was minted in his honour<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> *Orwell’s Literary Legacy featured on new £2 coin*; <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c78w999djg8o> (last accessed: 04/03/2026).

There are some lesser-known philosophical pages by Martha Nussbaum, written in 2005, which offer her interpretation of his masterpiece *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Nussbaum tells us that, in this novel, a gesture saves everything. In the novel's plot, however, it saves neither the protagonist nor the story, because we know how it ends. But without this gesture, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and its political significance probably wouldn't still be discussed today. Quoting Nussbaum:

A gesture haunts this novel, as it haunts the mind of Winston Smith. Routine, daily, undeliberated, the gesture is also hopelessly distant, its radiance the stuff of dreams. No one can make this gesture any longer. Politics has destroyed it. (Nussbaum 2005)

Which gesture are we talking about? The one present in the dream narrated in the diary of the protagonist, Winston, in which his mother is holding his sick little sister. He then saw this same gesture thirty years later in a television news broadcast: a Jewish woman was trying to protect her child from bullets fired by helicopters.

Orwell links these two gestures to the idea of the "tragic" and to the political significance that tragedy can have in society. The death of Winston's mother thirty years earlier had been tragic and painful. Orwell writes:

His mother's memory tore at his heart because she had died loving him, when he was too young and selfish to love her in return, and because somehow, he did not remember how, she had sacrificed herself to a conception of loyalty that was private and unalterable. Such things, he saw, could not happen today. Today there were fear, hatred and pain, no *dignity of emotion*, no deep or complex sorrows. (Orwell 2021:

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Dignity in emotions, Orwell writes: he tells us that collective emotions such as fear, hatred, and pain, may exist, but dignity must underpin the personal level of these emotions. He also tells us that this level consists of intimacy, unwavering loyalty, and love. However, this dignity can unfortunately be lost, annihilated, or destroyed.

This is Orwell's political accusation against totalitarianism. The loss of tragedy is an ethical loss above all else, consisting of the progressive irrelevance of personal actions and feelings, the emptying of memory, and finally, the annihilation of dignity. This is why it is important to remember that gesture, because remembering is how we preserve our identity.

We have now reached the crux of our discussion: dignity is restored through memory at the intersection of the "space of experience" and the "horizon of expectation". As mentioned previously, these are the two concepts that Paul Ricoeur borrows from Koselleck. Above all, dignity reclaims its *ascription*.

Memory is constituted as a model of something that belongs to me, within my lived experience, and this provides continuity and the ability to navigate the passage of time from the past to the future, establishing a sense of direction. Both individual and collective memory fulfil this unifying and orienting function. But what happens when this ascription is lost? What happens when memory and dignity are separated from the ascription?

Once again, we will use narrative examples. Take Wim Wenders' famous 1991 film *Until the End of the World*, for example (Wenders 1991). In the film, a blind woman (played by Jeanne Moreau) is finally able to see thanks to a procedure that transfers images and memories stored in the brains of sighted people directly to the blind person's brain. However, despite the excitement surrounding the experiment

and the joy of finally seeing faces, places, and scenes, something goes wrong. The woman becomes unhappy with the memories she gains as the experiment progresses. These memories affect her only as a spectator, as she has not participated in them. Others have experienced these memories and images. The experience of recording colours and shapes belonged to others, to those who encountered those places and faces with their bodies and emotions. A sequence of slides cannot capture development or acknowledge history if the path back to identity is forbidden; they only exist virtually.

A story emerges when someone makes it their own and recounts it to find themselves, seeking and recognising themselves in the flow of time and space. They experience it through their expectations, actions, choices and, above all, their silent, private memories.

This “extractive” obsession becomes arbitrary. Technological devices facilitate and amplify this disconnection of memory and experience from personal integrity, representing the catastrophic madness of the end of the world. “Look at it: it’s everything” says the scientist before the televised dream experiment is successful. “For me, it’s not everything. We don’t have the right”: Claire, one of the film’s protagonists, replies covering her eyes so as not to see, so as not to cross the border that expropriates images from possession.

We could also be reminded of a science fiction Tv series such as *Westworld*, in which androids act according to “narrative memories” built up by their creators, real existential plots inserted into the robots as databases. “Lifelike, but not alive”, as they say. The androids in *Westworld* move and behave like living creatures, but they are not alive, or rather, they do not feel alive. Being alive is an experience; androids have no “experience”, only “expertise”<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> *Westworld*, Tv Series created by J. Nolan and L. Joy, HBO, US, 2016-2022; it is based upon the 1973 film of the same name written and directed by Michael Crichton and loosely upon its 1976 sequel, *Futureworld*.

“Intelligence is about doing, while experience is about being”, writes the scientist Christof Koch in his book *The Feeling of Life Itself. Why Consciousness is Widespread but Can't Be Computed*, in which he adopts the Integrated Information Theory (ITT) of consciousness developed by the Italian neuroscientist Giulio Tononi (Koch 2020).

What if this happens to us?

Biotechnological devices facilitate and reinforce the separation of memory and experience from an individual's sense of self. For instance, extracted data becomes a reservoir of medical information; however, it is no longer “ours”. It does not belong to any specific medical service either. We do not entrust it to that service, we do not share a purpose for its use.

The initial *personalisation* of the service is contrasted by the complete *depersonalisation* of the bodily responses it generates. In medical and scientific research, a great deal of work has always been done to ensure that the reasons and purposes of both parties are explained, understood, and shared, based on regulations that have been developed over time. Regulatory work: it has taken place over time, and between different parties. But this has not happened in today's rapid biotechnological transformation, which has seen huge advances in recent years.

Consider also scientific experiments in memory transplantation or implantation, for example. We are also talking about externally provided content for the artificial perception of androids. Humanoid robots face similar cognitive challenges to humans.

Therefore, developing memory-based cognitive control architectures is key to equipping these robots with human-like intelligent behaviour and environmental interaction capabilities. Neural technologies aim to create artificial brain replicas or enhancements, which algorithms and data structures endow with individuality. We must ask

whether these replicas can be granted identity and dignity beyond individuality.

Can they recognise themselves in their own history through this memory implementation? Or, to employ Ricoeur's terminology, can they *ascribe* their own biography?

Even in robotics, shared memory is essential. Consider, for example, the "collective robotics" inspired by social insects and flocks of birds. Communication involves exchanging memories to perform actions, and the challenge lies in bridging the gap between globally defined tasks and the locally constrained behaviour of individual robots. The *Center for the Advanced Study of Collective Action* at the University of Konstanz in Germany has conducted extensive interdisciplinary research into the development of division of labour in robot swarms<sup>5</sup>. Biomedical nanorobotics can also benefit from this collective memory.

Let's also consider the "patterns" of radiomics, which enable diagnostic imaging to provide a more comprehensive representation of tiny areas of our bodies, thanks to algorithms that process comparative memory from increasingly rich databases (Miller, Gunderman 2009; Abbate 2026: 181–199). These patterns can become almost "narrative".

Having reached the end of our considerations, we can conclude that our body is the ultimate ethical boundary. It is not only a matter of biomedical practices, but also of the various forms of memory that will support its dignity in the future.

But how can we ensure that it will be treated with dignity? Both in the active and passive sense of the term. If ethics is capable of preserving our humanity, it must tackle this issue, taking into account Paul Ricoeur's contributions to future thinking.

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<sup>5</sup> <https://www.exc.uni-konstanz.de/collective-behaviour/research/structure/comoutional-methods/bio-inspired-swarm-robots/> (last accessed 02/13/2026).

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