

The Border of the Other: Study on an Expanded Conception of Corporeity in Psychoanalysis

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Abstract

In this article, it is stated that both in traditional clinical practice and as a methodological strategy in social research, the ultimate ambition of Lacanian psychoanalysis is to listen to the subject, suspending any ontological presuppositions prior to the very diction in which they are enunciated. The subject is strictly specified as supposed and coextensive with the utterance. Conceiving him as attached to a psychic duo modeled on anthropomorphic anatomical-physiological projections is a particular case and an ethnocentric and historically dated reduction of a more general structure, thus not restricted to such specifications.

Keywords: body, drive, subject, psychoanalysis, Lacan

1. Introduction

For Lacan, the psychoanalytic subject is not a psychological entity, a psychic object, to be approached theoretically, through an empirical psychology. The subject (separated) from the unconscious, by definition, is not to be confused with the (indivisible) individual. Lacan defines the field of psychoanalysis as that of "concrete discourse, as

the field of the subject's transindividual reality" ([1953] 1998: 259¹), and indicates that the unconscious would be "the part of concrete discourse, as transindividual, that is missing from the subject's disposition to re-establish the continuity of his conscious discourse" (260). The subject is pure signifier activity, without substantive or objectifying specification. Deprived of a nature other than that attributed in each context of his occurrence, the subject in question is insubstantially and intrinsically an agency that maps himself by what he does. In this way, he only accesses a revelation of his being when he is situated as implicated in his acts, something profoundly different from receiving information about his conduct, seen from the outside and from others.

Since the beginning, Lacan distanced himself from the subsumption of psychoanalysis to any form of psychological constructs, because they reify action in objective behavior (Lacan 1988). Although the main reason for the abandonment of the psychological vocabulary inherited from Freud is due to an epistemological impasse that inhibits the possibility of a science of personality in terms of concrete psychology (Bairrão 2003), the fact is that the solution found allows us to go beyond temporal and ethnic circumscriptions. The argumentative strategy developed in this regard makes it possible to go beyond the psychoanalytic clinic and expands the possibility of using psychoanalytic theoretical-methodological resources beyond their birthplace and the context of their original use. The act of listening neither adds nor validates anything other than the assent that something has been said there, sanctioning a message without judging or taking sides for or against a system of utterances. Dictative events are approached literally and regardless of the presumption of any type

¹ All quotations in this text are our translations of the Brazilian Portuguese versions of the works.

of substrate associated with their inscription.

The methodological-procedural nuance entitled 'participant listening' (Bairrão 2005) does not mean that observation has ceased to be important or has been replaced by listening. Observing is also an act that makes up meanings. 'Participant listening' only signals the discursive quality of all phenomena. Originally, the foundations of a reality are discursive events and as such can be observed, that is, the data carry an implicit enunciation of their establishment that requires them to be recognized as said and, therefore, listened. It is essential to listen to the meaning of someone's action and not exactly 'look' and describe things. This point requires the listener to allow himself to be understood by the other, in the sense of situating himself as signified and immersed in his world.

Thus, it is essential to broaden the understanding of the signifier in ways that are neither determined nor circumscribed to a specific ontology. The specificity of what is significant will admit a variability at least as wide as ethno-cultural diversity allows. Significance is immanent to any specific ethno-cultural premises that have formed one's birthplace. Signifier is whatever, in each context, 'makes sense'. What should be emphasized in the signifier is its nature as an act that produces meaning. In this way, listening can be extended to a wide range and diversity of what, in different contexts, can be admitted as a person and enunciator (Bairrão 2015).

However, to properly substantiate this expansion of the traditional scope of psychoanalytic listening, a challenge remains unthought: the critique of the assumption of the attachment of the drive to a bodily source pertaining to an anthropomorphic anatomy, even if topologically and psychoanalytically rethought. In order to be able to listen to the other, spirits, divinatory systems, plants, the dead, etc., it is not enough to situate the symbolic system as automatically 'someone', nor to find there a subject understood as a projection at some unconscious

level of a drive centered on a biological imaginary. The corporeal must be conceived beyond the limits of the anthropomorphic configuration. This third challenge is on the agenda and is intended to be addressed, otherwise the entire project of a Lacanian-inspired ethno-psychoanalysis will be weak.

2. Enunciation and Significance

The act of speaking establishes an enunciator, and the act of listening recognizes that enunciator. The subject is a significant activity without substantive or objectifying specification as to his nature. A subtlety that is difficult to see due to the habitual reduction of the subject to a type of being. In the context of possession cults, for example, gestures and performances (Bairrão 2004) and aesthetic-sensorial acts and events (Bairrão 2011) have the status of sayings and, for those who have learned this language, they become audible, as long as an understanding of the drive as detached and decentered from the biological imaginary is ratified.

In this action, what matters is the agent and not the substrate of the acted. Any significant event is a signifier, and even what is observed carries an implicit enunciation of its establishment, which requires it to be recognized as said and, therefore, listened. Underlying and establishing each and every reality (and regardless of its qualification as psychic, as intended by Freud and authors who succeeded him without breaking on this point²), there is a perennial enunciation, a primordial moment of a 'frozen' utterance, until that – by some rupture or civilizational trauma or simply critical confrontation – said can be unsaid.

² The clashes between Freudian psychoanalysis and anthropology are well known, as well as the ingenious solution found by Dévereux (1972), who, through the proposition of complementarism, created not only a way of brilliantly contributing to the history of psychoanalysis but also allowed the ontological status of Freudian propositions to remain intact and remain in the Freudian naturalism.

From a synchronic point of view, this primordial enunciation is most often implicitly reiterated and hidden from the realistic horizon of which it is decisive and which it would inform thoughtlessly. It spreads through space (scopic) and is embodied in the various classes of subject and ordering of cosmos that are culturally admissible in each context and that hang from the enunciative whole, both in the form of realities and virtualities attached to a 'skeleton' of the form of enunciation that, case by case, translates into an unconscious collective knowledge articulated in discrete elements determining signification, different case by case, structurally articulated with each other (the Other).

This articulation of a cosmos based on a dictional framework should not be interpreted as a creationist logorrhea. Enunciation has no other guarantee than that derived from the act of its enunciation and does not base any ontology, even if mirrored by the symbolic operations that support it. It is precisely this ontological nullity that makes it possible to generalize the listening device and to listen to the most diverse worlds, without the preliminary checking of determining what someone or a thing is.

Psychoanalytically, the Other proposes itself as and with the drive structure of the voice and, therefore, can be interpreted as someone, even if devoided of any guarantee beyond the intrinsic form of diction. This *someone* is modeled and can be embodied in any you, grammatically admissible in a given ethno-cultural context. Only by optical illusion can this specular effect, supported by the murmur of significance, support a claim to ontological grounding. Psychoanalysis does not give rise to ontological turns or validations in the strict sense. It allows listening to the wind, the forest, the sea, divinatory games, ancestors, stars, that is, whatever it is that in each cultural context can be admitted as an enunciator. In the same way, it can listen to the society, culture, groups, nation, party, imperialism, social memory or

motivation. All these assumptions of entities endowed with enunciative intentionality are on the same plane of unreality on which judgments are suspended. From a strictly psychoanalytic perspective, there is no room for hierarchies or validations.

The non-ontological status of enunciation ensures various models of subject and knowledge to be proposed, on the condition that the notion of significance is preserved at the level of insignificant radicality that suits it, that is, without translating it into some kind of objectivable entity. Signifier is whatever, in each context, 'makes sense'.

In reality, the point here is the 'make' rather than the sense, because the latter can speak or present itself as a gap. What should be underlined in the signifier is its character as an act, to make an act is to introduce a signifier relation (Lacan 2017). Due to an unfortunately common limitation in readings of Lacan's contribution to psychoanalysis, it is sometimes thought that the subject is only an effect of the signifier and the action, through the *a posteriori* projection of an agent at the beginning but to which it comes at the end. Now, "the Other provides only the texture of the subject, that is, its topology [...] At the very point in which he interests us, there is only the subject of a saying. [...] From this saying, the subject is the effect, the dependence. There is only the subject of a saying" (Lacan 2008a: 64). Therefore, the subject is inferred coextensively with the enunciative act, without positivity of any kind.

When introduced by a saying, it can only appear under the sign of impossibility, it only subsists by a kind of negativity as to what would define it propositionally: it is neither prior nor presupposition to the saying, nor is it constituted as a product at the end, detachable from the enunciating act. For Lacan (2016: 437), "[...] under the name of the unconscious, a signifier chain subsists according to a formula that you will allow me to expose: every subject is not one [*pas un*]".

It is noteworthy that the openness to listen to the literalness of a statement that cannot be imputed to a substratum of any order, namely discursive or subjective, is a point that requires attention even on the part of the most careful readings of Lacanian psychoanalysis, which stand out from the reductions of the subject to the psychological or to the effects of language. Even those that are specified based on a strict consideration of the mathematical and topological formalism – through which Lacan intended to formulate his theory – must be careful to prevent the risk of being translated by some of his readers as a ‘thin’ kind of substrate.

At the very moment when one says what is significant or preconceives that classes of beings are signifiers, there is an indexation to an ontology. Therefore, the status of (what is) the signifier must be conceived as non-ontological.

Lacan recommends an abstention from ontological pronouncements on the part of psychoanalysis, not because they are improper, but because the production and exploration of hypotheses about the being is an inexorable prerogative of the analysand. Psychoanalysis does not compete for a place in the competition between ontologies, since it sustains a praxis of listening in which the ontological narrative is provided as coming from the other.

The same argument can be taken up on a collective scale, in which psychoanalysis, instead of listening to individuals, metonymies of the modern time and of Western civilization, through a generalization of this particular case, is involved in listening to worlds, beyond singular personalities.

A coherent position regarding ontology in psychoanalysis must be better conceived beyond the proposition of a kind of negative ontology, whatever it may be, as a type of negative of ontologies, which could be consubstantial with psychoanalysis:

But will there be the being? As I noticed last time, I say that there is not. Being is, as they say, and non-being is not. There is or there is not. This being is only made when assuming it in some words – individual, for example, or substance. For me, it is just a fact of saying (Lacan 2008b: 160).

A fact of saying is supported by a speaking act. The facts of what is said only materialize an ontology as statements of the Other, and not as a psychoanalytic postulate. From the point of view of psychoanalysis, they only ex-sist in the quality of acts from which objects, concepts, and categories that we can stumble upon in the world hang in a significant web, once enunciated, insofar as the enunciation on which they are supported continues to produce an effect, without entering into the merits of ontological taking sides, from which psychoanalysis abstains.

In other words, a practically impossible task, or at least difficult to discern, since the means we have at hand are those of language, the consideration of the enunciation referring to the status of the psychoanalytically focused subject requires detachment from considerations of ontological content, without depreciating its relevance, in order to be able to approach the theme on the threshold or border of the enunciation, without rushing into assumptions about any presupposition, not even to deny them.

A better appreciation of this point is made possible by the consideration of the Lacanian approach to the drive, which detaches it from the anatomical-physiological naturalism and refers to it simply as what it is “in the body, the echo of the fact that there is one-saying” (Lacan 2007: 18).

3. The Corporeal Other

According to Lacan, drive is an assemblage of an enunciation coming

from the Other. Specifically, the source of the drive is situated in the body as Other, not restricted to the anatomical-physiological:

[...] These elements of the signifier treasure in the stage of enunciation, I show you how to recognize them, is what is called the *Trieb*, the drive. This is how I formalize the first modification of the real into a subject under the effect of demand, it is the drive. And if, in the drive, there was not this effect of demand, this effect of the signifier, it could not be articulated in such a manifestly grammatical scheme (Lacan 2003: 351).

To do justice to this thesis, with the radicality that is appropriate, it is important to deconstruct the habitual absorption of the subject to the ego, a symptom not only of a psychologizing distortion of the psychoanalytic to the psychological, but also indicative of an ethnocentric ontological presupposition regarding the nature of the soul.

Characteristic of this misrepresentation is the specular inversion between the source of the drive and its attribution to the anatomical, which leads to its assimilation by the anatomical configuration. As the enunciator is situated in the Other, he does not need to be linked to the anatomical duo of an individual. The drive is in the things themselves. The corporeal is marked by sensible experience, which is not immediately attached to an individual body, on the contrary, it aggregates it to a totality of aesthetic experience, case by case.

It is necessary to overcome the anthropocentrism and the subjectivist psychological naturalism, situating the subject as the border of a bodily surface that moves on the continuum of the sensation of the world, without fixing it in the 'realistic' imaginary of the representational. In other words, anatomy is a point of arrival and

not a point of departure, and the biomedical illusion of linking the real of the drive to the objectivist representational and related ethnocentric naturalism has to be undone.

The drive is fully articulated in terms of the signifier. According to Valas:

In *Subversion of the subject*, drive is defined as that which remains when the subject disappears in the demand (fading of the divided subject, which is the barred S); therefore, demand disappears. All that remains is the cut, so that the drive would be, properly speaking, the reduction of the demand to the cutting. This cutting is the very essence of the signifier chain; from this, it can be understood that, if the demand is talkative, the drive is silent; it is a silent demand, it is the echo in the body of the incidence of the signifier (Valas 2001: 67).

The drive should not be understood, therefore, from some ontological or anatomical-physiological reference, but rather from a topological equation of the structure proper to the signifier articulation in its corporeal inscription:

We sublimate, he [Freud] tells us, with the drives. But, on the other hand, what do we know about these drives? Where do they come from? From the horizon of sexuality, which has not been slightly clarified until today by the fact that they involve sexual satisfaction. But what we are told is that their jouissance is linked to sexuality. It is not a bad thing, at this level, that we have begun by stating that we know nothing about sexuality. On the other hand, what I articulated is that what is called, in topology, the border structure intervenes in

the drive. This is the only way to explain some traits of the drive. We can say, roughly speaking, that what functions as a drive is always characterized by holes in which the border structure is located. Only the border structure, taken in the mathematical sense, allows us to begin to have an understanding of what Freud articulates at the level of the *Drang*, of the drive, that is, that the flow conditioned by this border is constant. In this concern, I have included in my *Writings* a note, which I have developed further in the third edition, in which I refer to what in vector theory is defined as the flow of the rotational. In a word, the drive, by itself, designates the conjunction of logic with corporeity. The enigma is more concerned with this: how was it possible to summon the *jouissance* of the border to an equivalence with sexual *jouissance*? [...] Well, if there were not the configuration of the vacuole, of the hole proper to *jouissance*, which is something unbearable for what is regulated as tempered tension, you would not see anything in the sexual that is analogous to what I call, in the drive, the structure of the border. The border is made up, here, by a kind of defense logistics. This defense logistics, after all, is found on every corner, including in sexual practice, precisely to the extent that this practice is different from what is done in a hurry. [...] The enigma represented in the eyes of some by the sensibility of the vaginal wall, by the character, I do not say irreplaceable, but as if bordering female *jouissance*, by the enigmas that appear, we do not know why, when one studies female sexuality, all this would harmonize much more easily with the topology that we try to address here (Lacan 2008a: 223–224).

For a good understanding of the statement that the drive

designates the conjunction of logic with corporeity, it would be necessary to understand that corporeity is not reduced to a naïve conception of the body, and that logic (signifier) and corporeity are inextricable, and that drive is presumed, since there is no possibility of considering an erogenous corporeity logically prior to immersion in language.

In no way does this withdraw the bodily inscription of the subject. But the body must be understood as the totality of the aesthetic experience, its true and delicate core. Corporeity expands beyond the solipsistic and anatomical-physiological abstraction of the primate. The universe is a body: the inscription of surfaces as a section only imaginarily focuses on the biological and anthropomorphic body.

The border of the drive can be represented in images of the body, but it is important to distinguish such 'objective' representations from an eyelid or sphincter in the anatomical-physiological sense. What is turned on or off is an image of the world, by the way, seen from outside the body that represents itself as a forecaster. Grasping or letting go extends to the totality of bodily motility and to the events of the world, the surface of the ground on which one walks and lays the sole of the foot is bodily extension.

How can there be body and subject beyond the anatomical inscription? The answer to this question depends on an overcoming of anthropomorphism. The anthropomorphic is the effect of a type of perspective that, once complete, asynchronous, timeless, loses the real and the thread of events as an act of significance.

The anatomical-physiological representation is neither primary nor real. The anthropocentric perspective of the consciousness and the subject introduces a separation purely pertaining to a reactive and biological being, which is not the subject of psychoanalysis. For this reason, it is necessary to "de-anthropocenter" the notion of the subject by extending the corporeal to the totality of sensible experience.

The borders of the sensible make up the border of the body and in any of them, as a signifier, one can place the S1 that represents, in the place of the Other, the position of an enunciator, in relation to the whole of significance.

On this broad basis, semantically diverse and diversely articulable interlocutors in disparate worlds are composed as 'someones', physiological and/or abstract, all aesthetically and instinctively equable, who fight and dialogue with each other.

The aesthetic experience is the body of the subject, not to be confused with the body of the ego, the anatomical-physiological abstraction modeled on and support of the ego. The corporeal is marked by the sensible experience, which is not immediately attached to an individual organism, on the contrary, it aggregates it to a totality of aesthetic experience, viewed case by case.

Significance and aesthetics, structure and corporeity, do not go in parallel, they coincide. What Freud called support is thought of by Lacan as a "topological community" between structure and body:

Do we not see in the Freudian metaphor the embodiment of this fundamental structure – something that comes out of a border, that reduplicates its closed structure, following a path that makes a return, and of which consciousness assures nothing but the object, as something that must be circumvented? This articulation leads us to make the manifestation of the drive as the form of a brainless subject, because everything there is articulated in terms of tension, and has no relation to the subject other than a topological community. I could articulate the unconscious as being situated in the gaps that the distribution of significant investments establishes in the subject, and that are figured

in the algorithm in a diamond [◇] that I place at the heart of any relation of the unconscious between reality and the subject. [...] Something in the apparatus of the body is structured in the same way, it is because of the topological unity of the gaps at stake that the drive has its role in the functioning of the unconscious (Lacan 2008c: 178).

What basically makes topology relevant in psychoanalysis is to articulate subject and body in a way that goes beyond the spherical geometry originating from the delimitation of the oppositional pair interiority/exteriority and makes it possible to consider the body beyond its representational imaginary, placing the living body in continuity with the world seen and traversed, for instance.

It is necessary to go against the propensity to apply topological structures in psychoanalysis without immersion, seeing them 'from the outside'. This 'formal' overflight and objectivity distorts the real into representation. The form of the body is the body of the form and it is from this other place that it can situate, on the plane of radicality that suits it, the challenge of situating the site of the subject on a maximum plane of generality and formalism.

The use of topology in psychoanalysis requires a fidelity to the non-ontological and not a remission of formalism to an understanding of structure in the sense of a 'light' ontology. Whatever the nature of a supposed substratum, even a purely formal one, must be in abeyance, otherwise the structure will be dissociated from the sensible sphere in which it is embodied. Although topological study seems to rise to abstraction because it deals with properties/invariants irreducible to concrete physicality, it must be taken as referring to entities whose existence is indistinct from the status attributed to empirical reality. In this way, the topological notion of surface is empirically found in the interstice – here understood as an interval, a gap, of zero thickness –

between the atmosphere and the water of the oceans, for example. In the same way, the projective plane ex-sist as an articulator of what Lacan called the mirror stage, a constituent mirage of the unity of the bodily image that makes the existence of a real object coincide on the plane of the virtual image – which refers to the myth of Narcissus, whose fascination with his own image leads him, fatally, to the bottom of the waters.

One does not have access to an empty, purely formal structure, without the spice of bodies, of perspectives. But it is necessary to emphasize in the drive the doing and not the anus, the being and not the mouth, the space and not the eye, the listening and not the vocal apparatus. That is, to specify the drive in doing, looking, hearing, thinking, grasping, walking, gushing, sucking, expelling, retaining, etc., but not in the eye, in the ear, in the voluntary musculature, in the urethra, in the anus or in the mouth. According to Lacan:

Gap, drive, an alternation of sucking, to follow certain indications of Freud: this is what we need to deal with, and this is what we tried to do by basing it on a topology. The structure of what is enclosed is, in fact, inscribed in a geometry in which space is reduced to a combinatory: it is, properly speaking, what is called a border. By formally studying it in the consequences of the irreducibility of its cut, we will be able to reorder some functions, between aesthetics and logic of the most interesting ones. Thus, we perceive that it is the closure of the unconscious that provides the key to its space and the understanding of the impropriety that exists in making it an interior (Lacan [1964] 1998: 852).

Lacan identifies the four partial drives with certain forms of

relation of the subject to the Other – oral drive to the demand for the Other, anal drive to the demand for the Other, scopic drive to the desire for the Other, and invocatory drive to the desire for the Other. These terms that delimit the relationship to the Other, demand and desire, are also articulated by a privileged topological structure, the toric surface: first, as a circuit whose turns around the central and peripheral axes of the torus introduce the counting of the turns of desire and demand, respectively; soon after, as intertwined torus, showing how the tracing of the path of one torus on the other – the subject's torus and the Other's torus – reproduces a kind of mirroring, so that what is read in the subject's torus as demand coincides with what is inscribed in the Other's torus as desire, and vice versa, which would be characteristic of the neurotic structure that would tend to take the demands of the Other as constitutive of the subject's desire; finally, only punctually sketched by Lacan, it can be seen that the inversion of the toric paths presented in a 'simultaneous' way by the tracing of a torus on another that is intertwined with it is homologous to the inversion obtained by the toric upheaval – a question that seems crucial to situate a transformation of extreme relevance in Lacan's elaborations, correlated with the conception of the immersion of the subject in the field of the Other, namely, the impossibility of separating subject and Other as two independent entities, subsisting as inverse positions, or, more precisely, averse to each other, revealing the mechanism underlying the observation that the subject receives his own message from the Other in an inverted way.

In addition to the scope of developments based on toric topology, the topology of surfaces in their various compositions of border structures is identified by Lacan as articulating the 'drives' in their modalities, each surface corresponding to a partial object: the oral drive to the sphere, the anal drive to the torus, the scopic drive to the projective plane, and the invocatory drive to Klein bottle:

If the object *a* can function as an equivalent of *jouissance*, it is because of a topological structure [...] Here, it is in a place that we can designate by the term *ecstatic*, combining the intimate with the radical exteriority. That is, this occurs to the extent that the object *a* is *ecstatic*, and purely in the relation established by the establishment of the subject as an effect of the signifier, and as determined by itself, in the field of the Other, a border structure. It is easy to see the variations of every border structure. It has the option, so to speak, of coming together, either in the form of the sphere, apparently the simplest of topological structures, in which the border thus drawn joins at a point there that is more problematic, either in the form of the torus, in which the two opposite borders that correspond point by point in a double vector line come together, or, on the contrary, it is in the form of the cross-cap, or by a combination of the two possibilities, in the so-called Klein bottle form. It is easy to see the kinship of these four topological structures with the object *a*. There are also four of them. Just as they effectively function in the relations generated between the subject and the Other in the real, the four objects reflect one by one the four structures. [...] object *a*, at levels accurately exemplified by the clinic, is in the position of functioning as a place of capture of *jouissance* (Lacan 2008a: 240–241).

Finally, the introduction of the theory of knots and the speculations about the Borromean knot in the context of Lacan's teaching somehow replace the previous topological developments operated by the psychoanalyst from the topology of surfaces. This movement is mostly read by the Lacanians as a radical turn of Lacan in a direction opposite

to what he had been developing previously, either in the understanding of the status of the structure and its relevance as an articulating notion of various theoretical constructs – reflecting on a reconsideration of clinical structures and differential diagnosis, moving towards a kind of continuity between neurosis and psychosis with the notion of generalized foreclosure –, or in the supposed reconsideration of his research program with well-defined epistemic assents that he would have found his downfall in the impotence of the mathematization of knots.

However, there are other possible readings, which, in a movement contrary to the aforementioned tendencies, intend to operate a fold in Lacan's teaching that establishes a kind of circularity, as opposed to the linearity that coincides with a progressive reading, operating a reading of knots from topological invariants of surfaces, taking them as embeddings into surfaces, specifically, as a particular case of multitoric pathways (Affonso 2020).

In this line of investigation, the notion of 'knot embedding' is taken as the best translation of Lacan's idea that it is the cut that creates the surface: it is the knot (or chain) that determines the type of surface that can host it – in the case of the Borromean knot, a multitoric surface of genus three or higher is required. However, the knot embedding should be understood as a topological object that originates in the between-two, knot and surface, through the embedding procedure, being an unforeseen operation, which is evidenced by the verification of the existence of different embeddings of the same knot on the same surface.

Although it may be objected that the toric surface constitutes a structure inferior to other border structures, namely, the projective plane and the Klein bottle, with regard to the articulation of a spatiality in which interior and exterior are in continuity, we indicate that in the plane of the subject as a two-dimensional writing of the fundamental

domain of the surface, following Lacan's ([1972] 2003) indications, the presumed closure admits a multiplicity of configurations in which the central and peripheral axes alternate and, with that, the internal and external spaces do too, constituting a virtuality to which the subject is indifferent, since the inscriptions in its mesh are not affected.

The embedded knots can also be conceived as waves on a surface, produced by fissures and self-crossings of the surface in question, which would allow a better articulation of the notion of field, widely employed and of a central role in contemporary physics, but only sketched in the scope of psychoanalysis by Lacan, indicating his aspiration for the constitution of a rigorous approach to what he called the 'field of jouissance'. These topological articulations refer to Lacan's comparison between the subject and the electron "at the point at which the latter proposes itself to us at the junction of the wave theory and the corpuscular theory" (1992: 97), indicating two ways of approaching the subject according to the wave-particle duality: one infers that the subject would occupy an identifiable place in space and would possess mass, the other would admit interference with other waves and the absence of mass, thus identifying it in different places at the same instant (Eidelsztein 2020).

Such a conception of the knot embedding would allow a topological articulation between the signifier chain that links the subject in his intervals to the letter that derives from the location of the signifier, constituting the differentiation at the core of the situational that establishes the combinatorics of the structure as real. The inextricability of the relationship between differentiation and location refers to the crucial notion of structure, as an articulator of differentiability through the positional relationship of elements to each other. However, the structure must not be conceived as transcendental potentiality, but in its current immanence, since one cannot genetically anticipate the system of differences to its concrete situation.

Here we find a homology between the writing of the letter, as a settler of privileged relations between signifiers that is only revealed by reading, with the enunciation of a saying, as an act that produces meaning, inseparable from the listening that makes it audible. If there is no desire to know that escapes from the passion of ignorance, however, the incidence of the scopophilic and invocatory drives makes themselves seen and listened, especially from where it is not expected.

The following report by a researcher from the ethnopsychology laboratory brings some elements that attest to the aesthetic, non-verbal dimension of body kinesthesia that participates in the enunciation of a saying:

I narrate below a conversation I had with Inaê, Eulália's entity, in a meeting of bewitched people. [...] I observe all the bewitched ones when they incorporate. It is a thing that makes me feel softness, enchantment, something that pleases me a lot. I observe the entity of Eulalia. I notice the movements of the arm that are undulating, smooth, resembling the waves of the sea. [...] F: When you incorporated I thought you were from the sea, you made some gentle movements, with your hands moving as if they were waves. She smiles and says to me: I am soft, different from the medium who is more agitated. I am of pure Iemanjá, Inaê. I am a jellyfish. Whoever has the purity of the spiritual can come close to me. Who does not, I will burn. It is a way of self-defense (Pellicciari 2008: 143).

Eulalia, whose name refers to eloquence, becomes an instrument for a saying that crosses her and is enunciated by all her pores and

movements, it is the jellyfish³ that condenses in its name the duplicity between the cnidarian animal and the environment in which it lives, indicating the transposition of the relationship between the *Unwelt* and *Innerwelt* by implying that it is water, the environment, which lives and causes to act, thus subverting the implicit concentric geometry of individualized bodies. The movement of the waves of the sea and the tentacles are mixed; in the heart of the icy water, there is the hidden presence of the antagonistic element of fire that remains inert, but ready to act in defense of the entity, burning the impure ones who dare to approach.

In short, it is a matter of 'de-anthropocentering' the category of subject and drive, definitively preventing the shadow of its reduction to the ego, and expanding corporeity to the aesthetic. Thus, the aim is not to disqualify or disavow the particular case of liberal clinical listening in the Viennese model, but to generalize it to other cases and different contexts, and thus to emancipate psychoanalysis from the main blind spot of ethnocentrism of its origin; the idea of a psychic substance that owns a soma.

Whatever the nature of a substratum, even the formal one, must be absent – to be able to overcome anthropocentrism and subjectivist psychological naturalism. How? By situating the subject's hole in a bodily surface that moves on the continuum of the sensation of the world, the boundary between the symbolic and the real, which is the perceptual, without fixing it in the 'realistic' imaginary of the representational.

The extension of the body is that of the world and the cutting of surfaces is only imaginarily centered on the biological and anthropomorphic body. It is important to invert the thesis of a subject

³ In Portuguese, the name for jellyfish is 'água-viva', which would literally translate as 'living-water', since 'água' means 'water' and 'viva' means 'alive'.

linked to the corporeal, by that of a corporeal spread to the field of the totality of sensible experience. On a case-by-case basis, the drive activity is configured on the border and by embroidering on and from the Other.

The totality of the aesthetic sphere is corporeal and a field of significance, any trace or inflection in the world allows us to situate the subject. The strumming of a string, fragrances, do not affect bodies, they are bodies. The point is not the skin as the boundary of an interior and an exterior, an I and not-I, but the contact of the skin as an opening to the Other. The supposed inside and outside in relation to the anatomical, topologically, are situated as a continuum. The egoic imprisonment is disconnected to a somatic duo that binds the eye to the detriment of the seen, the ear to the detriment of the sound, the foot to the detriment of the path.

4. Final considerations

The original sin of psychology is the search for a cosmicidal universality, disconsidering what contradicts it. The search for universality cannot be based on the imposition of one world over the others. It implies an act of epistemic abstinence, in the perspective of an intercivilizational armistice, without prior guarantees of common ground.

The primacy of the ontological itself is ethnocentric. Psychoanalysis, in its clinical practice and as a research method, does not impose or add anything to the ontological. This subtraction, paradoxical as it may seem, is a positive contribution to promoting a broad circle of conversation based on the establishment of a device of dialogue between worlds, with regard to the psychological sphere, namely, ethnopsychology. It is a field in constant reconstitution, through partnerships that do not exclude or silence the voice of any of the relevant interlocutors for this construction, no matter how exotic or illusory they may appear due to validation criteria extrinsic to their

reality.

Psychoanalysis allows for an ethnographic description that is particularly attentive to linguistic detail and to the fact that the utterance is not reduced to the verbal. It does not dispute with other psychologies the privilege of being superior or more scientific, because it has abdicated the exact and objective definition of its object and does not suffer from the bias of trying to control and reify it in predictable behavioral patterns.

This is not exactly abandoning the field of scientific debate, even if not necessarily expecting recognition by the 'scientific community' or, in this sense, intending to 'do science'. Although abstaining from the dispute with the psychologies for scientific legitimacy in terms of the hegemonic scientific paradigm in contemporaneity, namely, that of the biological sciences or neurosciences, precisely because abdicating the definition of its object in empirical-materialist terms, that is, the reification of the subject in predictable and controllable behavioral patterns through experimentation, his repudiation of this political-ideological apparatus is not because of some mysticism or poetic art, but it is a demand for rigor and coherence of the set of hypotheses that aim to satisfy another paradigm of scientificity, called conjectural sciences.

As it does not reduce the enunciator to the psychic, nor does it pre-conceptualize a class of entities, physical or metaphysical, that can support this function, the psychoanalytic approach circulates between the individual and the collective, the social and the subjective, since the raw material of significance is not determined by it, but rather the cultural resources of the horizon to which the listening points. The Lacanian 'trick' consists in considering that it can be both the particular that mobilizes collective history (and culture), and the social that permeates and retouches the individual.

Initially, it is considered that, in any construct of the world, when it is exposed, as it is an act, the subject of that act is also exposed and revealed (without losses of the semantic content that is independently intrinsic to the statement) within the framework of the deponent's universe of reference. In hearing something about someone, the analyst does not impose it, either by suggestion, persuasion, or other forms of coercion, insofar as its validation depends on the assent of the other.

If the description above describes well the particular case of the psychoanalytic clinic, it is important to highlight that, radicalized in a perspective of suspension of ontological conceptions and in the reality of each and every ontology, some ethnocentric circumscriptions of classical psychoanalysis are surpassed and the listening device can be extended to different worlds and realities. This is because Lacan's rupture with the normalization of a reality standard, which ignores its dependence on shared and particular symbolic constructs, must affect in practice all cases in an indistinct way, that is, without safeguarding some specific reality to which one is more attached, thus constituting a methodological procedure indifferent to its content, yet sensitive to their ethnic context.

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