

Lacan, Nietzsche, and the Problem of a Supposed Decentered Subject from Psychoanalysis: Perspectives for Thinking

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Abstract

The objective of this article is to compare some aspects of Friederich Nietzsche's and Jacques Lacan's conceptions of the subject. The text proceeds from the observation that in both Nietzsche and Lacan, human language, its function, and its field are considered from a primary and founding perspective of the world, that is, poetic, even though such proximity to this point of view hides some differences and tensions, which we will also try to identify. Such contrasts occur especially with regard to the greater breadth and radicality in the scope of Nietzsche's critical reflection on the problematic nature of the characterization of the unity of the Self, even though Lacan's decentered subject seems to follow in the same direction.

Keywords: Subject, decentering, listening, speech, word

1. Introduction

This text proceeds from the perspective of the encounter that was never likely to happen, between psychoanalysis and philosophy, insofar as, in a way, each of them begins where the other ends. Even though the activity of the psychoanalyst and the philosopher are characterized in different ways, within the scope of psychoanalysis, philosophizing

occurs and, in a way, philosophy interrogates culture, the philosophical activity, and the history of philosophy with a psychoanalytic perspective, as we believe we find in Nietzsche, which was observed and recognized by Freud (Fonseca 2016). Parodying Heidegger, the psychoanalyst and the philosopher 'live close together, in the most separated mountains' (Heidegger 1979: 51, our translation). Even though within the scope of Heidegger's thought the quote concerns the relationship between the philosopher and the poet, perhaps it can be presented here from this other perspective, that of the relationship between the philosopher and the psychoanalyst, since in both, Nietzsche and Lacan, the poetic function is founding and works as a means to establish a possible dialogue between them and their respective works about the word as a place of truth in its nascent form, a different place from that of the *ego cogito* and which, in this sense, questions the role of rationality and contests the unity of the Self based on the unity of consciousness – seen by Nietzsche as one of the prejudices of philosophers, and verified by Lacan as an obstacle to the analysis, insofar as this notion of Self, elaborated over the course of centuries and which is at the heart of a great deal of the philosophical discourse, is also a prejudice shared by common consciousness.

For Lacan, there is a certain 'pre-analytical conception' of the Self that exerts its attraction on the psychoanalytic thought due to what Freud's theory introduced, which was 'radically new about this function' (Lacan 1985: 9, our translation). The first warning that we make here is that this Freudian 'subversion' finds antecedents in philosophy, especially concerning Nietzsche, both in the recognition and denunciation of the illusion of the naive – and at the same time elaborated – conception of the Self as a unity of conscious and demand of coherence, and in the consideration of a 'truth in a nascent state' (Lacan 1985: 11, our translation). It has a founding function of the world – based on the phenomena of language and to which knowledge

comes to be linked, which, if on the one hand, gives meaning to what is recognized as truth, on the other, presents an inertial function. It is understood by Lacan as anything endowed with its own inertia that interferes with this poetic capacity to always founding the world again and that, due to its cumulative effect as a deposit of conceptions in language, ends up demonstrating the propensity to ignore its own meaning as a sediment of the forms of knowledge that accumulate in the human experience of recognizing the world. Lacan denounces that there is a tendency that, even in the conditions in which psychoanalysis promoted its 'Copernican revolution' regarding the function of the Self, the situation once again degrades to the previous stages of understanding the Self, which can be observed even in Freud, in the Enlightenment trust that he put in science and psychoanalytic healing.

According to a Lacanian reading, in the Freudian context, especially in the early years, therapeutic techniques, such as hypnosis and free association, were conceived to promote changes in the Self, that is, enabling it, in a lasting and perhaps permanent way, to resist conflicts and, maybe, find ways to harmonize with instinctual forces – something that would correspond to a lasting achievement, which would extend after the end of the analysis. Over time, this gave rise to a certain dogmatic attitude that exposes the ambiguity of Freudian psychoanalysis' relations with the Self and leads to an impoverishment of the revolution it perpetrated. Such an ambiguous attitude is questioned by Lacan through his theoretical conceptions in general, but, above all, through his way of understanding the psychoanalytic technique as anything that aims at the proximity and valorization of the truth in its nascent state, that is, as a founding function of truth, as that which establishes knowledge, but at the core of which there would be a decentering (Lacan 1985) concerning science, insofar as this *areté* given in the valorization of the word in its nascent state points to the poetic function. This has serious implications within the

scope of the psychoanalysis technique and defines the analytical act in its cutting function, aiming at the flaw that inhabits the core of the word structured in a discourse: the being of thought is 'the cause of a thought as something out of sense', insofar as its process is a 'process of failure', in which knowledge appears as a cause, a cause in thought and, most of the time, it is worth saying, from a delusional perspective (Lacan 2008). This is what appears highlighted in the Lacanian technique and which highlights the poetic function of the word.

In contrast to this valorization of the word and speech as a poetic function as we see in Lacan (and also, as we shall see, in Nietzsche), most of the time in common discourse, speech appears word by word, brick by brick, as if building a wall that prevents us from seeing beyond the relationship between subject and object and problematizing our own thinking self. Such speech appears as something quite deep and entropic, which is in agreement with the perspective of resistances, of the almost always involuntary maintenance of repression (the intellect as a symptom of the structuring of the subject and its 'unknowing', as is so evident in the case of the 'rat man': *a knowledge about which nothing is known*). This is often insinuated in psychoanalytic offices and stops free association.

2. Words as beings of language

There is, however, a poetic speech in the sense indicated above, a *proetry* (prose and poetry together), as in '*Galáxias*', by the Brazilian poet Haroldo de Campos; as in Baudelaire's 'Little Poems in Prose'; as in Joyce's 'Ulysses'. These can be considered as narratives and simultaneously as beings of language, as creations and recreations of the world that are not exhausted, since they appear as language *in concreto* and, precisely to that extent, are infinite – just like speech from the point of view of free association also appears inexhaustible and is also the purest creation, however impure it may be. There is

living and talking about living, but there is also the structure of talking. And there is what this saying and unsaying, this spinning and unraveling of the word under analysis, reveal within the scope of the different levels or layers in which language presents itself and within which there is the possibility of free association that unlocks the register of meaning.

The linguist Chomsky (1966) distinguishes two levels in the linguistic fact that may interest us here to talk about the analysand's speech: the level of 'competence' and the level of 'performance' (Pignatari 1977). The first refers to the linguistic mastery of the language, in its basic structures, which become, so to speak, relatively unconscious with the continuous use of the word and with its accommodation in the speaker's language, in its singularity. The second level, that of performance, is what the speaker can say and create based on the linguistic competence that is established deep within the surface of the word. These two levels work together when using words. The child learns by creating, but the process of miseducation that ordinarily guides us towards decreation, understood here in the sense of structured knowledge, leads us to use language only at the level of competence, placing performance in repetition. This is the reason, in most cases, for the great difficulty of free association in analysis to be truly established, or, in other words, the analysand's full exercise of the poetic function. To get out of this vicious circle, it is necessary to reopen the valves at the level of performance, in a way returning to the possibility of not censoring the word, establishing a relationship of greater fluidity and trust with it. The stereotypical use of the word, which does not understand that language is always in crisis, leads us to distrust in relation to the structuring possibilities of language, even though we know that, in its origin, the word has always been the founding of the world for a subject that experiences and knows.

The exercise of the word in analysis produces an effect on the relationship between competence and performance, as the act of speaking increases confidence in the level of competence. This means that the word appears in the analysis more aware of itself as a word and not as a pure and simple reference to the thing, which makes it possible to increase performance and, with that, the creative use and the broadening and deepening of the perception of oneself and of life. This is not an effect of erudition, it is not a merely conceptual improvement, but rather a relationship with language itself, which goes from the register of mere metonymy to that of metaphor – what we can call, as analogy, the poetic experience of language and, Heraclitianly, as free game. This language is characterized by being radical (from the Latin *radix, radicis*, root), it implodes self-censorship and allows access to the sources or roots of the word where the speaker finds or reinvents its truth. The word branches, pluralizes, expands, and flourishes as a being of language. This goes against both the inhibition of language and moral orthopedics or univocal and dogmatic meanings.

In this sense, how are these language processes established in the scope mentioned above, that is, that of competence and performance simultaneously?

According to Jakobson (1974), in linguistic terms, there are two processes of discourse structuring, whether more or less poetic in the sense proposed here: (1) by contiguity or proximity or (2) by similarity or resemblance, which form, in turn, two axes: (1) the paradigmatic, which refers to the selection by similarity, and (2) axis of combination by contiguity, called syntagmatic. When you see the blue surface of the sea and remember someone's blue eyes, this is an association by similarity, which resembles the effect of metaphor; on the other hand, when you evoke a person through a book they gave you as a gift, you make an association through contiguity, which is similar to the notion

of metonymy. (Jakobson 1974: 149)

Pignatari (1997) warns us that the same thing occurs with linguistic signs. Since childhood, we have become used to linking certain sounds to an object, that is, we have become attached to a phonetic system that is connected to speaking and remembering, which presents us with a relationship by contiguity – associating words with the designated object. Surely there is something arbitrary about this, as poets never tire of demonstrating to us in their productions. On the other hand, if you imitate the sound of a moving train or the sound of a beating heart, you are facing an association by similarity. Charles Peirce (1992), the creator of semiotics or the theory of signs, considers the symbols as contiguity signs and the icons as signs by similarity. The words themselves, which are symbols, in the Peircean sense, are organized according to the two axes.

For the linguist Jakobson (1974: 155), two figures of rhetoric predominate in this structuring: metonymy and metaphor. Metonymy, in this sense, means taking the part for the whole and prevails in the syntagma, that is, it works through contiguity and is observed in words in general. In this case, there is an association between the phonemes determined in the language, which form the word and the thing they designate, the real object. Therefore, in this case, there is not much difficulty in understanding, as it easily evokes a mimetic logic of Platonic extraction. The words in a sentence, in turn, are extracted from the idiomatic lexicon found in dictionaries, and from grammatical categories, where they are grouped based on the similarity of the functions they have in the sentence. As a result, there is a low definition in the language that works only at this level, as the degree of information in these cases becomes increasingly residual, as generations pass, tending towards entropy, that is, stereotyping, dilution that impoverishes the speech.

The metaphor functions differently as a figure of rhetoric: it exists by analogy (displacement, the art of deviation). We notice traces of similarity between two things and relate them in a metaphor, as when the Persian poem says that 'the moon is the mirror of time', meaning that it is at the same time on the edge of nothingness, like a reflection, and, on the other hand, it has eternity as its measure, like time itself. Another example occurs in the Icelandic 'The Saga of Grettir' (anonymous): 'There was a storm of swords and raven's food'. In this verse, there is a contrast between two metaphors, one tumultuous, representing the battle itself, and the other cruel and contained, where 'raven's food' is a synonym for 'corpse'. Another Icelandic metaphor by Egil Skallagrimsson is 'the dew of the sword', that is, the blood, which inspires us with the vision of a lineage of jocular, daring, and brutal men. In the 'Beowulf' saga, written around the year 700 A.D., the sea is the 'path of sails'. Another Viking metaphor: the poet is the 'blacksmith of songs'. Homer, in the 'Iliad', calls Sleep the 'brother of death'. In Book III of 'Rhetoric', Aristotle observed that metaphor is always the intuition of an analogy between different things. He did not seem to have a proper linguistic awareness of this. However, Jorge Luis Borges, in his text 'The Metaphor', from 'History of Eternity', calls metaphors 'verbal objects' (Borges 1985).

The metaphor is a kind of icon by contiguity, which is a kind of contradiction. Pignatari (1977) says it is 'a degenerate icon'. It would perhaps be a *quasi-icon* by contiguity. Very simply speaking, metaphor is a similarity of meanings, or, put another way, a transposition or translation of similarity between perceived objects.

There is also the case of the similarity of sounds between the signs that designate these objects, called paronomasia, as in 'violent violets'. In other words, in paronomasia, the analogy is not just between the designated objects but is brought to the letters, to the sounds, which are the figures of the signs. Paronomasia is a legitimate icon due to

similarity. In the Japanese language, for example, this use of words is very frequent in poetry because of the relatively few possible phonemes in that language, which forces repetition more often. In Portuguese, this can also be exemplified by the popular puns. While metaphor is a similarity of meanings, paronomasia is a similarity of signifiers. It is the possibility of innumerable occurrences of similar sounds within a language system that generates the conditions for the emergence of phenomena such as paronomasia, rhyme, and alliteration (which is a chain of same or similar sounds at determined intervals and which also favors, equally, the memorization process). According to Pignatari, 'fifty phonemes are responsible for the formation of the eighty thousand words that constitute the basic lexical repertoire of the Portuguese language' (Pignatari 1977: 14, our translation).

It was Jakobson (1974: 161) who first realized that language presents and exerts a poetic function when the axis of similarity is projected onto the axis of contiguity: when the paradigm is projected onto the syntagma. In terms of Peirce's aforementioned semiotics, we can say that the poetic function of language is marked by the projection of the icon onto the symbol (1958: 276), that is, by the projection of non-verbal codes (musical, visual, gestural) onto the verbal code. Making poetry, in this sense, is transforming the symbol, the word, into an icon, a figure, considering that there are visual figures, but also sound ones. What is important, in clinical terms, is to understand the projection, in poetry, of an analogical grammar onto the logical grammar of language. This is why the grammatical analysis of a poem is so insufficient – because the poem creates its own grammar, which could be compared to the merely conceptual analysis of the patient's speech, whether in reference to the common language through which he expresses himself, whether through the bias of psychoanalytic theory. It is not about meaning but about blades of meanings and

biases. In this sense, by analogy, it is necessary to listen to the patient beyond theory, like reading a poem. As Borges writes, the word itself is already an aesthetic creation, and we realize this better when we translate or when we speak a foreign language, in relation to which we are relatively eccentric: 'This does not happen with our mother tongue, whose words always seem to us to be inserted into the discourse' (Borges 1980: 124, our translation). However, both the choice of words and their chaining in speech present a dark side, a hidden bed beneath the surface of the influx of speech, where the most obscure levels of speech take place, and, perhaps, also the most revealing ones. In Latin, the words 'invent' (*inventio*) and 'discover' (*invenire*) are synonymous, which is in agreement with the Platonic doctrine, according to which inventing and discovering are the same as remembering.

It is at the intersection between unveiling and fabulating that the analysand's speech takes place. In the former Freud, interpretation tended towards linearity, even though he resourcefully alluded to an (unconscious) discourse beneath the (conscious) discourse, which proved to be insufficient and, as a result, the Viennese psychoanalyst was faced with the failure of his conditions of analysis. In the mature Freud, in 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' (1937), the patient's speech is more like a hyperbole and there is no longer, on the part of the analyst, that *furor curandis* of the early days. What we see is a Freud who experiences (and talks about) the tragic aspect of psychoanalysis.

Perhaps it would be more comfortable, for example, as the first Freud also did, to conceive of the interpretation of the language of dreams based on the possibility of manualization, but the structure of dreams condenses and displaces a vast and plural range of meanings, that is, the language of the dream is polysemic, and the excess of interpretation, instead of closing the case, actually stops the movement of the analysis, insofar as it interrupts the patient's fabulation, which

remains that way again hidden beneath the words already spoken, in layers that overlap and retreat into the shadows (for this is the nature of repression). Dream analysis, therefore, has a function only when it produces movement towards free association.

Resuming the comparison, art happens in the encounter between the work and the public, just as psychoanalysis occurs in the transference relationship. In the same way as we saw here, contemporary visual artist Joseph Beuys says that 'art does not exist to provide knowledge in direct ways'. For this artist, 'it produces in-depth perceptions of experience. More than simply logically intelligible things must happen [...] Where objects are implicated, it is more a matter of indication or suggestion' (Shellmann 1977: 20, our translation). The creative act is, therefore, founding, in the same way that the analytical act must be. There is, therefore, a decentering of the subject, which is not seen from a structured consciousness, but rather through what in this consciousness appears as a flaw, as a crack, which, on the other hand, paradoxically, allows the articulation of knowledge.

3. Around a decentered subject

In fact, 'decentered subject' is a very common expression in the scope of psychoanalytic studies, thus, due to its ambiguity, it allows us to introduce here Nietzsche's critique of the *ego cogito*.

How could the expression be problematic? Certainly not from the point of view of *decentering*. From our point of view, if this expression in itself seems correct for the experience of Psychoanalysis, the existence of a problematic 'subject' at the bottom of decentering is still affirmed, which for us, considering the expression itself, seems to be a reflection of a relatively arbitrary use of language, of a seduction of words – which seems to preserve a vocabulary fetish and a dogmatic consideration about the unity of the Self. It is an expression that both

affirms and denies decentering, as it brings within it the subject, who bursts again triumphantly from the vortex of the whirl. There is, so to speak, a dialectical dependence related to the tradition that affirms the unity of a subject. The decentralized subject is, as might be, an expression that preserves the insipidity of a notion too contaminated by what was linked to it before Lacan, when he intends, precisely, to affirm a radical difference concerning it. Lacan, since Seminar 2, offered between 1954 and 1955 (2010), and also throughout his teaching, defines this decentered subject as a missing subject, which corresponds neither to what underlies his consciousness nor to what is expressed in the unconscious through desire, but negatively through language, lack, and instinctual life. This means that what gives humanity to the human being, what makes the individual a subject, is found in the tension between the unconscious and the real on the one hand, and consciousness, the symbolic and the imaginary, on the other – which enables the subject to be defined exclusively by the lack that arises from the real, as a negativity, as anything essentially fragmentary, lacunar, inconsistent and that lives under the sign of incompleteness. This is certainly something that resonates in art, as we have seen so far, but also in what is artistic in the analytical practice.

If there are, in psychoanalytic thought, those who defend that it is Lacan's merit to rescue the notion of subject based on the decentering, opposing this notion to that of the individual (Anhaia 2023) – which for certain authors has in its origins link with capitalism –, I wonder if it would not be more promising, perhaps, to insist on the work of the negative, and if, instead of removing the mask from the rational subject's face, it would not be more appropriate to perceive the non-existence of the face, so that we can finally appreciate a spectacle in another setting that can only imply the disappearance of the self, in the form of a radical de-subjectification, even if an empty chrysalis shell is preserved proceeding from the grammatical use of the

consecrated notions of subject and object. To this end, I suggest resuming Nietzsche's philosophy, especially the first part of *Beyond Good and Evil*, entitled 'On the Prejudices of Philosophers' – is there a radical reflection on the insufficiency of the subject of consciousness? What justifies the substantialization of the Self, understood as a subject, at least from the point of view of a supposed immediate certainty, as Descartes understands?

'I think' implies that I compare my momentary state with other states observed in me to establish what it is, as it is necessary to resort to 'knowledge of different origin', since 'I think' has no value of 'immediate certainty' for me. Instead of this security in which the common one may come to believe, the philosopher only removes a handful of metaphysical problems, of true cases of intellectual consciousness that can be put in the following way: Where do I get my notion of 'thinking' from? Why should I believe in cause and effect? With what right can I speak of an 'I' and an 'I' as the cause and, to wrap it, the cause of thought? (Nietzsche 1992: 22, our translation).

This is a radical question that has been posed at least since Plato's *First Alcibiades* and that crosses the history of philosophy, eventually flowing into the bay of Schopenhauer, but also in Nietzsche, Freud, and Lacan. In this sense, we could use as a resource the statements of the aforementioned Lacan, in order to preserve the spirit of his speech, when he writes in 'Function and field of speech and language' that it is in the internal unity of speech, given in temporalization, that the subject of consciousness marks the convergence of what was and which, imaginatively, constitutes him (Lacan 1998). Imagination does not exactly occur because there is subjectivity in the discourse, but

rather because there is belief in its objectivity, the source of the subject's alienation. This is fundamental in Lacan's theoretical gesture, but, on the other hand, by insisting on the word 'subject', he preserves something of the alienation to which he refers and allows himself to be imprisoned sometimes in the Cartesian web, sometimes in the Kantian one – a word use that produces the forgetfulness of the symbolic activity from which it comes from. Because, according to him: 'In every knowledge already constituted, there is a dimension of error, which consists in the forgetting of the creative function of truth in its nascent form' (Lacan 1985: 30, our translation), its allusive and metaphorical function. This consists of the flaw in the meaningful chain that makes knowledge never return to the original knowledge that establishes this fictitious unit called 'subject', which is himself an object among other objects.

4. A true game of mirrors

In Nietzsche, as we alluded to above, there is always an opportunity for us to try to get rid of the mistakes that occur within words, which always put us at risk. Parodying the philosopher: Where do I get my notion of 'subject' from? Why is it useful for me to support the use of this term, even while affirming its decentering, and precisely for that reason? If language, less than designating, is merely allusive and only circumvents grammatical relations with its butterfly flutters, perhaps its 'non-subjected' invention is preferable, and we can conceive the experience of saying in the same way as someone who hears in the unison of a song the myriad of voices and echoes of other voices, and which even support an involuntary choir on the ground.

It is interesting to briefly appreciate here how the discussion of excision of the self and decentering appears in Nietzsche. When Nietzsche addresses the 'divided subject' in its most general sense, he, like Lacan, inherits a discussion introduced by Descartes and continued

by Kant as his two main representatives. This discussion concerns the nature of the self and the 'thinking' in 'I think'. In a way, Nietzsche continues and radicalizes the critique of the Cartesian 'I think' introduced by Kant in his famous chapter on the 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason' (from *KrV*). Kant recognized that there was an impassable gap between a formal 'I' and an empirical 'thinking'. Kant's 'I' was no longer understood as a substance, but as a formality. What the self could be 'referring to' had, at best, the status of an unknowable and inaccessible thing in itself. We see Nietzsche resuming this conception, as he also conceives of the Self as a purely fictitious construct, without any reference to a substantive nature of the Self. However, Nietzsche addresses the tendency in the rationalist tradition to misinterpret the self as a substance in a different way than that proposed by Kant. At the heart of this misinterpretation, Nietzsche also locates a 'paralogism', but if in Kant the rationalist tradition misunderstood the notion of subject, and applied to it two different meanings respectively in the major and minor of a syllogism, in Nietzsche's analysis, the rationalist tradition imitates the subject-predicate logic of conventional grammar, and applies it as a substance-accident scheme to subjectivity. In Kant, there is the critique of rationality. In Nietzsche, in a complementary way, there is a critique of language. For Nietzsche, tradition would have appropriated the grammatical subject, transforming it into a matrix for the existential subject.

The subject, in this case, merely alludes to a subject of enunciation, a subject of discourse, it is an essence, it is an instrumental self for communication because, in use, it necessarily constitutes itself as opposed to itself and the other to whom it is addressed – the 'you'. It thus constitutes an elementary self-other opposition in the dialogical situation. This 'I' designates, in all instances, the one who says 'I', as such it designates no one in particular, and therefore cannot provide us, as speakers, with any substantial knowledge of ourselves. Still,

such a relationship is necessary in the communicative or dialogical situation, because without this ability to refer a discourse to a speaking self, there would be no communication.

For Nietzsche, in this sense, the acquisition of language and the development of consciousness of the Self are simultaneous processes, which introduce into the psychic sphere the possibility of a division between the self and the other, to the extent that the dialogical situation is internalized and transferred for the inner life. Therefore, just as an 'I' can address a 'you', the 'I' – thanks to internalization and transference – can also address itself as a 'you'. However, with the substantial difference that now the 'you' is another part of the 'I'; a part with which we identify in the discursive sphere.

In Nietzsche, this dialogical situation becomes a true game of mirrors, since every instinctual tendency tends to assault the consciousness and become provisionally subject to all possible objects, including the self, which is in agreement with its conception of will to power.

With the formation of an 'I', psychism seeks, in its fragility, to judge and gain control over what it considers to be reality (external and internal). This 'I' is, therefore, a collection of several selves, several units in conflict, or amalgamated, competing with each other or supporting each other for the control and stability of the relationships that are thus constituted. In this sense, a 'will to power', applied to the intimate life of psychism, becomes 'wills to power', where several conflicting instinctual tendencies collide in their battle for power (W. Müller-Lauter, G. Abel, W. Stegmaier, and E. Schlimgel, for example, give us evidence of this). Given this situation, we find in Nietzsche a perspectivism intimate to psychism, insofar as the so-called self, as a plurality of subjects, is populated by countless instinctual tendencies that continue and discontinue each other and perhaps do not deserve, in the end, to receive the label of subject, precisely because it is

decentered, leaving this discussion of a supposed decentered subject perhaps still very focused on modernity – if we consider that we have, between Lacan and Descartes, or between Lacan and Kant, this previous debate already established by Nietzsche.

Our internal experiences exist primarily as unstructured chaos. However, upon this chaos, we impose a certain order. This implies that we, through language, impose our interpretations on a given material, and, as such, organize and shape that material to fit it into a new linguistic medium. This again implies that the translation of inner experience into language involves an inevitable distortion, falsification, and simplification of the inner experience. Still, Nietzsche emphasizes that language introduces us to the only inner world we can know. We can only know this already simplified and falsified inner world, which is why we refer to a supposed subject. Our simplifying language transforms the unfamiliar and the other into the familiar; it also reduces the Other, the capital A, into one for us.

The subject remains a fragile construction because its self-interpretations are fragile; or, to put it more strongly, the subject is always a fragile notion because the interpretations are always fragile. Now, because the *fallasser* knows this unconsciously – but knows it as a repressed knowledge that cannot be admitted into consciousness – he also fights a tenacious struggle to maintain his interpretations and his truths, even if they are merely beings of language, intact entities of speaking and naming. It is because interpretations are the always fragile foundational network of the self that there are in both Lacan and Nietzsche the master signifiers of the speaker, according to which the semantic plots are constituted.

To be more fair to Lacan than we were initially in our reflection, we must also consider the effort made by the psychoanalyst to create a language that would provide a certain distance in relation to these essentially paranoid language plots. However, as we still see this

expression being used today, I believe that we can once again, as I tried to do here, allude to the problem in the conflicting expression 'decentered subject', without, however, taking this criticism in a strong sense, as long as whoever use it realize its irony and the trap it preserves within it.

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